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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, there has been a dramatic shift in how
securities are traded in the capital markets. Utilizing
supercomputers and complex algorithms that pick up on breaking
news, company/stock/economic information and price and volume
movements, many institutions now make trades in a matter of
microseconds, through a practice known as high frequency trading.
Today, high frequency traders have virtually phased out the
“dinosaur” floor-traders and average investors of the past. With
the recent attempted robbery of one of these high frequency trading
platforms from Goldman Sachs this past summer, this “rise of the
machines” has become front page news, generating vast
controversy and discourse over this largely secretive and ultralucrative practice. Because of this phenomenon, those of us on
Main Street are faced with a variety of questions: What exactly is
high frequency trading? How does it work? How long has this been
going on for? Should it be banned or curtailed? What is the endgame, and how will this shape the future of securities trading and
its regulation? This iBrief explores the answers to these questions.

INTRODUCTION
In today’s highly electronic age, virtually everything in society—
including communications, music, television, and financial transactions—
have gone digital. Today, many trades on the stock markets2 are carried out
¶1
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There are three types of stock markets in the United States. First, the traditional
exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), where most of the
action takes place on a trading floor where brokers and dealers meet face to face.
Second, markets such as the NASDAQ, where traders are physically dispersed
and dealers’ offers to buy and sell are displayed and executed on computer
screens. Third, the alternative trading systems (ATSs), which are computers that
match customer orders to buy and sell without the intermediation of a dealer.
See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE TRADE-THROUGH RULE (June 6,
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via complex automated computer programs. These programs are constantly
evolving, with faster computers and programs being developed every few
weeks. Virtually gone are the days when nearly all securities were traded
across the vast floors of stock exchanges by men yelling and wearing bright
checkered jackets in order to stand out amongst the crowd. Instead, the
majority of trades are now dominated by traders utilizing powerful
computer algorithms in a practice known as high frequency trading (HFT).3
Many stock trades now originate with fully automated “high frequency”
funds, “a phenomenon that has accelerated during the market turbulence of
recent years because of the relative success of the strategy.”4 These
supercomputers allow such firms to make trades in a matter of
microseconds and to shell out thousands of trades before a normal person
could even blink their eyes. While advocates of these trading platforms
claim they are adding liquidity5 into the market or “making [the] financial
markets more efficient,”6 critics believe this practice is unethical and
“destroying [America’s] capital market structure.”7
At its essence, high frequency (HF), or algorithmic trading, is
computer determined trading; the algorithm makes important decisions such
as timing, price, or in many cases, executing the entire order without human
interaction.8 HF trading is widely used by pension funds, mutual funds, and
other investor driven institutional traders to divide large trades into several
smaller trades in order to manage market impact and risk. These
¶2
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26, 2010) (broadly defining algorithmic trading, its uses and objectives and the
key players utilizing these trades).
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supercomputers and algorithms look for signals – such as the movement of
interest rates, miniscule economic fluctuations, news and other subtleties –
to take advantage of these indications before anyone else in the market is
even aware of them. The computer systems being used in the markets today
can break down large orders into extremely small slices and “execute them
across different trading venues at close to the speed of light.”9
The main objective of high frequency trading “involves minimizing
risk and posting small deal sizes that enable [HF traders] to move in and out
of trades extremely quickly, arbitraging between spreads available on
different exchanges and platforms, and even between the speed of trading
available on them.”10 There are many forms of HFT. Some HF traders are
known as market makers and trade on signals to make markets by providing
securities on each side of a buy and sell order.11 Other HF traders utilize
algorithms to try to speculate where the markets are going to move in the
short-term.12 Regardless of the strategy these high frequency traders utilize,
they all attempt to do the same thing: Make vast profits by being smarter
and faster than everyone else.
¶3

In the last five years, there has been a major surge in the amount of
trading carried out by high frequency traders. According to Boston-based
consulting firm Aite Group LLC, it has been estimated that a third of all
European and US stock trades in 2006 were driven by automatic
programs.13 Today, high frequency firms, “which represent approximately
2% of the 20,000 or so trading firms operating in the U.S. markets . . .,
account for 73% of all U.S. equity trading volume.”14 According to Matthew
Rothman, an analyst from Barclays Capital, “five years ago, less than onequarter of U.S. stock-trading volume was generated by ‘high-frequency’
traders, and few considered the funds more than a niche strategy.
[However,] the niche’s role now overshadows that of mainstream brokers,
mutual funds and hedge funds.”15 The dramatic increase in HFT is most
likely due to its profitability. Despite the economic recession, highfrequency trading has been considered by many to be the biggest “cash
¶4
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TRADING, July 10, 2009, available at
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cow” on Wall Street and it is estimated that it generates approximately $15$25 billion in revenue.16
Part I of this iBrief explores the history and development of high
frequency trading to its current stance of prominence in today’s markets.
More specifically, it describes how trading orders on the various exchanges
and markets began becoming computerized and how the different
regulations that were put into place set the stage for the algorithmic trading
revolution. Part II then delves into the current uses of high frequency
trading by various institutional investors and HFT firms. This section
provides an in-depth description and analysis of the market components that
allow HFT to function, as well as a brief overview of the types of HFT
strategies in use. Lastly, Part III gives an analysis of the controversy and
legality of the various HFT strategies, their proposed regulation, and the
benefits and harms of HFT on the marketplace and America’s capital
structure.
¶5

I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING
While computerized trading has only recently gained
widespread notoriety, it is not new. Computerization of the order flow
in financial markets began in the mid 1970’s with the introduction of
the New York Stock Exchange’s “designated order turnaround”
system (DOT) in 1976, and later Super-DOT in 1984.17 DOT and
later Super-DOT allowed the transmission of orders to buy and sell
securities to the proper trading post electronically. These orders
appeared on a special electronic workstation called the “display
book,” which permitted each specialist firm to execute orders for the
market.18
¶6

Before this, “financial information was disseminated slowly,
usually by ticker tape, and telephonic communication was expensive.”19 In
the previous era of floor-based trading, buyers and sellers stood literally
next to one another, “allowing for the expeditious identification of
¶7
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ZEROHEDGE, http://zerohedge.blogspot.com/2009/07/goldmans-4-billion-highfrequency.html (Jul. 17, 2009, 2:16AM) (discussing estimates by the FIX
Protocol, an organization that maintains a messaging standard for the real-time
electronic exchange of securities transactions).
17
Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise
of Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 865,
897 (2008).
18
Id.
19
Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435, 1458 (2008).
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counterparties.”20 However, once exchanges started implementing
computerized communication, buy and sell orders could be executed much
faster; traders could be connected to a trading platform rather than being
physically present on trading floors.
Additionally, in 1971, NASDAQ became the world’s first
electronic stock market and allowed dealers to compete in the provision of
quotes for securities. NASDAQ did not employ a specialist auction system
and instead employed competing market makers in an electronic quotation
system.21 “By 1992, NASDAQ volume was accounting for some 42% total
share volume on all U.S. markets.”22
¶8

The era of floor-based trading drew to a close in the 1980s with the
advent of fully electronic financial markets and a trading strategy called
program trading. Still in use today, program trading is loosely defined by
the NYSE as the placing of orders to buy or sell 15 or more stocks valued at
over $1 million total.23 This practice became widely used in the 80s in
trading between the S&P 500 equity and futures markets. With the aid of
computers, program traders could buy or sell stock index futures contracts,
such as the S&P 500 futures, and sell or buy a portfolio of up to 500 stocks
at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) matched against the futures trade.
This program trade could be pre-programmed into a computer to enter the
order automatically into the NYSE’s electronic order routing system at a
time when the futures price and the stock index were far enough apart to
make a profit.24 This practice, known as stock index arbitrage, was later
blamed by some as leading to the 1987 stock market crash.25
¶9

While computerized trading in the 70’s and 80’s was dominated by
trading on the NASDAQ and NYSE, the game changed in the late 1990’s
with the emergence of other electronic trading venues known as electronic
communications networks (ECNs). An electronic communication network
is a type of computer system that facilitates trading of financial products,
such as stock and currencies, outside of the traditional stock exchanges.26
¶10
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Dean Furbush, Program Trading, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/ProgramTrading.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2010) (providing a detailed overview of the types of program trading and the
history of its use).
24
See id. (detailing the practice of stock index arbitrage and why it is considered
to be one of the most controversial forms of program trading).
25
See Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6.
26
See LAUREN LIEBENBERG, THE ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL MARKETS OF THE
FUTURE, AND SURVIVAL STRATEGIES OF THE BROKER-DEALERS, 73–75 (2002)
(providing an introduction to ECNs and how they work).
21
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ECNs became very popular in the late 90’s after the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) authorized their existence with its Regulation
Alternative Trading Systems (Reg. ATS).27 Reg. ATS was pushed through
in 1998 by then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, who was dissatisfied with the
duopoly the NYSE and NASDAQ enjoyed.28 After Reg. ATS, the
emergence of these alternative trading systems made it possible for
individual investors to trade after-hours outside of the exchanges, and
eventually more computer systems began developing that facilitated the
entry and execution of orders electronically by algorithms.29
Individual investors subscribing to ECNs can enter orders
electronically into the network via a custom computer terminal, and the
ECN will then automatically match and execute contra-side orders.30 If no
match is identified, then an ECN order can be posted externally on
NASDAQ as soon as it becomes the best price. This arrangement allows
ECNs to “function as a hybrid between a broker for counterparties, a
broker-dealer or market-maker, and an exchange, and their gain has been at
the expense of NASDAQ.”31 The early ECNs provided many benefits over
past trading venues—including the reduction in costs and trading errors,
enhancement of operational efficiencies, and other benefits associated with
risk management. Eventually, day-trading firms who originally sought
greater market access to NASDAQ, as well as brokerage firms, began
hustling to set up ECNs; and the growth rate of ECNs has skyrocketed since
1997.32 The growth of these ECNs in the late 1990’s led to the wider use of
algorithmic trading and eventually the rise of independent high frequency
trading firms.
¶11

Another milestone came in 2001, two years after Reg. ATS, when
stock exchanges started quoting stock prices in decimals instead of
fractions. This “decimalization” of the exchanges changed the minimum
stock tick size from 1/16th of a dollar to $0.01 per share and further
encouraged algorithmic trading by ECNs. What this meant was that
“overnight the minimum spread a market-maker stood to pocket between a
bid and offer was compressed from 6.25 cents…down to a penny.”33 This
move decreased a market-maker’s trading advantage and led to increased
¶12
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Id (emphasis in original).
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See id. at 78-79 (listing the competitive advantages and economic benefits of
ECN’s and how they have gained on NASDAQ’s market share since their
inauguration in 1997).
33
Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6.
28

2010

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 016

liquidity,34 which in turn eventually led to the current boom in algorithmic
trading. In this more liquid market, institutional traders began splitting up
orders according to their algorithms to execute trade orders faster and at a
better average price.
The final important development in the history of HFT occurred in
2005, when the SEC pushed through Regulation National Market System
(Reg. NMS)35 Reg. NMS is a series of initiatives promulgated by the SEC
which were designed to modernize and strengthen the national equity
markets. Through Reg. NMS, the SEC has promoted a national market
system, which includes rules such as the Trade Through Rule (Rule 611),
the Access Rule (Rule 610), the Sub-Penny Rule (Rule 612) and the Market
Data Rules.36 Before Reg. NMS, brokerages had plenty of wiggle room to
match buy and sell orders internally and pocket the spread, or to “send them
to exchanges that paid kickbacks for order flow.”37 However, under Reg.
NMS, and particularly the updated Trade-Through Rule, it is now decreed
“that market orders be posted electronically and immediately executed at
the best price nationally.”38 Reg. NMS was the final structural move that set
the stage for the current electronic trading revolution.39 Today, high
frequency trading firms such as GETCO and certain hedge funds take
advantage of the structural changes implemented by Reg. NMS by “posting
continuous two-sided quotes on hundreds of stocks” and even scooping up
the price differences that result from momentary lags between exchanges.40
¶13

II. THE PRACTICE OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING TODAY
Today, equity trading volumes in the US and also in Europe are
dominated by high-frequency traders. Most HF trading firms use a variety
¶14
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Liquidity is the degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in
the market without affecting the asset’s price. Assets that can easily be bought or
sold are known as liquid assets. .
35
See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg.
37,496, 37,532 n.300 (2005).
36
See, e.g., id.
37
Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6.
38
Id.; accord CRS Report for Congress, supra note 2, at 2-4 (stating that the
Trade-Through Rule mandates that when a stock is traded in more than one
market, transactions may not occur in one market if a better price is offered on
another market).
39
Reg. NMS applies equally to all markets and eliminates the distinction
between securities associations, such as NASDAQ, and the exchanges (like
NYSE). The new rules mandated an improved system of inter-market linkages
be developed, so that all traders have access to all automated quotations across
markets, and can avoid trade throughs. See, e.g., CRS Report for Congress,
supra note 2, at 2–5.
40
Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6.
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of practices and strategies to consistently stay ahead of the market and
execute trades before anyone else even realizes it. Many of the profitmaking devices HF traders employ depend upon important major
components which underlie all HF strategies. In this section, a variety of the
unique characteristics of HFT and the trading strategies HF traders employ
will be analyzed, along with several examples of how these strategies are
utilized for profit by today’s independent HF firms and institutional
investors.

A. Components of high-frequency trading and nature of the markets
In its simplest form, high frequency trading involves the collection
of tiny gains (sometimes measured in fractions of a penny) on short-term
market fluctuations. High frequency trading firms hunt for temporary
inefficiencies in the market and trade as quickly as possible to make money
before the brief distortions go away. Because of this, high frequency trading
is characterized by a high turnover in capital and is dependent on a variety
of market components that enable traders to turn a profit. The distinguishing
characteristics of high frequency trading strategies include a dependence on
ultra-low latency, the limited shelf-life of trading algorithms and the
reliance on multiple asset classes and exchanges.41
¶15

The speed factor in trading is known as “latency”, and is an
important component of all high-frequency trading strategies. Trading
strategies that optimize the value of high frequency algorithmic trading are
highly dependent on “ultra-low” latency. Ultra-low latency refers to trading
at speeds of less than 1 microsecond. In order to turn a profit, HF traders
have to flow information into their algorithms microseconds faster than
their competitors. Therefore, to remain competitive, HF traders must
constantly upgrade their computer systems to stay ahead of the pack.42 “To
realize any real benefit from implementing [HFT] strategies, a trading firm
must have a real-time, collocated, high-frequency trading platform—one
where data is collected, and orders are created and routed to execution
venues in sub-millisecond times.”43 Many of these trade profits, however,
are measured in pennies or even fractions of a penny. To remain sufficiently
profitable, HF traders utilize ultra-low latency to execute hundreds of
thousands of trades before the average investor even knows what is going
on. Because of HFT’s reliance on ultra-low latency, the practice has become
¶16
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See Iati, supra note 13 (explaining the various components of high-frequency
trading strategies and how high-frequency firms rely on these components to
make a profit).
42
MacKenzie, supra note 3.
43
Iati, supra note 13.
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a “technological arms race.”44 In the HF trading world, speed and the most
innovative technology separate the winners from the losers. The current
trend in employee recruiting is to hire traders with degrees in math and
computer science from the top schools, many traders even with PhD’s, in
order to stay competitive.45 Many of today’s high frequency traders are
“practical, problem-solving people with an engineering background.”46
Taking advantage of ultra-low latency is not an easy task, and the
competitive advantage of a high frequency trading algorithm normally
dilutes over time. Algorithmic codes tend to have a limited shelf life and
must be constantly upgraded to stay ahead of the competition, sometimes
every few days.47 While frequent upgrading was extremely expensive in the
past, technological innovation has made this much easier today. Some
programs, such as the Apama Algorithmic Trading Platform,48 “[make] it
possible for day traders to build complicated trading algorithms almost as
easily as they draw icons across a digital desktop.”49
¶17

At the micro-level, high-frequency trading strategies are constantly
altered for two important reasons.50 “Firstly, because high frequency trading
depends on ridiculously precise interaction of markets and mathematical
correlations between securities, traders need to regularly adjust code . . . to
reflect the subtle changes in the dynamic market.”51 Today’s capital markets
are extremely volatile and constantly changing, which means the
relationships that form the core of algorithmic trading strategies sometimes
change within minutes.
¶18
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See Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html (describing the
competition for newer and faster technology in the markets that allow traders to
execute trades faster than their rivals).
45
See Phil Wahba & Emily Chasan, Geeks Trump Alpha-males as Algos
Dominate Wall St, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B114220091202 (detailing the
changing social and technological nature of securities trading on Wall St).
46
Id.
47
See Duhigg, supra note 44.
48
See, e.g., Progress Software, Algorithmic Trading Accelerator,
http://web.progress.com/en/apama/algorithmic-trading.html (last visited Jan. 6,
2010) (detailing how this platform functions and allows traders to build their
own algorithms).
49
Charles Duhigg, Artificial intelligence applied heavily to picking stocks –
Business – International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/23/business/worldbusiness/23ihttrading.3647885.html [hereinafter Artificial Intelligence].
50
Id.
51
Id.
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The second reason that firms must constantly alter their trading
strategies is because of reverse engineering by rival firms.52 “Competitive
intelligence is so good across all rival trading firms that each is exposed to
the increasing susceptibility of their strategies being reverse engineered,
turning their most profitable ideas into their most risky.”53 In order to stay
ahead of the competition, firms must constantly alter their algorithms. The
best algorithms are worth a fortune; and traders in the HFT business must
be aware of attempted theft and reverse engineering. The paradigm case
occurred last summer with the attempted theft of a variety of trading
strategies from Goldman Sachs. This attempted theft54 illuminated the
possibility that millions of dollars could have been lost if the perpetrators
succeeded.
¶19

The last major characteristic of high-frequency trading is its
reliance on multiple asset classes and exchanges. “Since many of these
strategies require transacting in more than one asset class and across
multiple exchanges often located hundreds of miles apart, i.e., NY to
Chicago, that infrastructure will often require roundtrip long haul
connectivity between data centers.”55 Through a practice called “colocation,” some HFT firms deal with this issue by purchasing real estate as
close to securities exchanges as possible. “This ‘co-location’ means a high
frequency trading system can access prices a fraction faster than if it were
located down the street, let alone another city.”56 Because of the vast
benefits of co-location, there has been a recent rush for real estate proximate
to the exchanges. Office space in such areas sometimes costs an
astronomical amount, but firms are willing to pay for it. For instance, in
Chicago, 6 square feet of space in the data center where the exchanges also
house their computers can go for $2,000 or more a month.57 Despite these
high prices, the number of firms that co-locate at exchanges such as the
NASDAQ has doubled over the last year.58 Their proximity to the
exchanges enables such firms to gain information on orders and market
movements more quickly than the market as a whole, which allows them to
effectively implement their strategies to make very large profits.
¶20
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Id.
Id.
54
More detail on this attempted theft is discussed in section III.
55
Posting by Tyler Durden, supra note 16.
56
Mackenzie, supra note 3.
57
See Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6 (stating that some trading firms even
spend 100 times that much to house their servers).
58
Sal L. Arnuk & Joseph Saluzzi, Toxic Equity Trading Order Flow on Wall
Street: The Real Force Behind the Explosion in Volume and Volatility, THEMIS
TRADING LLC WHITE PAPER, available at
http://www.themistrading.com/article_files/0000/0348/Toxic_Equity_Trading_o
n_Wall_Street_12-17-08.pdf.
53
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One such HFT firm, Global Electronic Trading Co. (GETCO), is
located directly in the same building as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME). Until recently, GETCO was a relatively unknown company and its
Web site contained little more than a reading list of investment books.59
However, according to Moyer & Lambert, GETCO buys and sells 15% of
all the stocks traded in the U.S. and was reportedly valued at $1 billion as
recently as two years ago.60 GETCO earns these vast profits by buying and
selling securities up to thousands of times a second; its vast profits and
proximity to the CME have come under increasing scrutiny in the last 8
months.
¶21

B. Different Types of HF Trading Strategies Employed
HFT firms such as GETCO have developed a variety of complex
algorithms that enable them to employ multiple trading strategies with
minimal human interaction. Some of the most popular HFT strategies
include automated market making, low latency arbitrage, and liquidity
rebate trading. Additionally, the practice of issuing “flash orders” to highfrequency traders and the use of certain Alternative Trading Systems
(ATSs) by those competing with HF traders have come under increasing
scrutiny in recent months. These computerized “neural networks” and
“genetic algorithms” permit computers to create new rules and
automatically change underlying assumptions about the markets. They then
evolve by letting different rules compete, and combining the most
successful outcomes.
¶22

Through market making, high-frequency firms try to make money
on the difference between the amounts that various investors are willing to
buy and sell a stock for. This price differential is known as the “bid-ask
spread.” To make money off of the spread, market makers will buy and sell
securities on both sides of the trade by placing a limit order to sell (or offer)
above the current market price or a buy limit order (or bid) below the
current price in order to benefit from the bid-ask spread.61 HF traders do this
automatically, by inputting the order limits into their algorithms and letting
the computers do the work. Some high-frequency firms also utilize such
algorithms to automatically “ping”62 stocks to identify large reserve book
¶23
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Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6.
See id (describing the mystery that surrounds GETCO and the vast profits that
this company makes off of high-frequency trading).
61
See Algorithmic Trading, supra note 8.
62
In “pinging,” an automated market maker issues an order ultra fast; and if
nothing happens, it cancels the order. If something does happen, then the market
maker learns hidden information that it can use to its advantage.
60
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orders by issuing an order very quickly and then withdrawing it.63 Through
this practice, traders obtain information on a large buyer’s limit and then
they use this to buy shares elsewhere and on-sell them to the institution.64
Taking advantage of ultra-low latency and co-location, these highfrequency market makers can execute hundreds of thousands of orders in
seconds to shave money off of the bid-ask spread. By co-locating their
servers in the NASDAQ or the NYSE building next to the exchanges’
servers, automated market makers can react much faster than other
investors. These automated market makers account for a significant
percentage of the volume of trading that takes place on the NASDAQ and
NYSE.65 While some believe market makers keep buy and sell prices close
together to the benefit of investors, others scrutinize the practice for its lack
of regulation and for the inherent unfairness that can result from colocation.
Another similar type of trading strategy is called market arbitrage
and involves “taking advantage of different rates, prices or conditions
between different markets or maturities” and then trying to make money off
of the price spreads and inconsistencies in these different markets.66 For
instance, an arbitrager might take advantage of price differentials between
markets by buying a stock for a lower price in one market and selling it for
the higher price in the other. While these price differentials may only exist
for a matter of seconds, high-frequency traders can execute trades on
multiple securities and capture the spread before they diminish. The new
neural networks that many HFT firms use today can consider thousands of
scenarios at once and arbitrage the spreads before anyone else can.67
¶24

While arbitraging as a strategy has been around for a while, it has
gained much more popularity recently with the use of complex automated
algorithms. Stock index arbitrage was utilized heavily in the 1980’s by
program traders to make money off of the inconsistencies in the NYSE
between futures prices and the S&P stock index; it was blamed by some as
contributing to the crash in 1987.68 Today, latency arbitragers use
¶25

63

Mark Hutchinson, High Frequency Trading: Wall Street’s New Rent-Seeking
Trick, MONEY MORNING, Aug. 14, 2009,
http://www.moneymorning.com/2009/08/14/high-frequency-trading/.
64
Id.
65
See Artificial Intelligence, supra note 49 (describing that just one such market
maker, Automated Trading Desk, a division of Citigroup, alone accounts for
about 6% of the total volume on the NASDAQ and NYSE).
66
Arbitrage, FINANCIAL DICTIONARY, The Language of Money,
http://www.anz.com/edna/dictionary.asp?action=content&content=arbitrage
(last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
67
Hutchinson, supra note 63.
68
See Moyer & Lambert, supra note 6.
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algorithms to create models of great complexity that can involve hundreds
of securities in many different markets. This practice is highly lucrative. For
instance, the financial markets research and advisory firm TABB Group has
estimated that annual aggregate profits of low-latency arbitrage strategies
exceed $21 billion, an amount which is spread out among the few hundred
firms that deploy them.69
Another strategy called liquidity rebate trading involves taking
advantage of the certain “rebates” that some exchanges offer trading firms
that are willing to step up and provide shares when needed. Market centers
such as the stock exchanges and the ECNs offer these rebates in order to
attract trading volume.70 Such rebates can range from one quarter to a third
of a penny.71 Liquidity rebate traders make a profit by looking for large
order flows and then filling a part of a large order, then re-offering the
shares at the same price and collecting the exchange fees for providing
liquidity to the market.72 “If the order is filled, the market center pays the
broker dealer a rebate and charges a larger amount to the broker dealer who
took liquidity away from the market. This has led to trading strategies solely
designed to obtain the liquidity rebate.”73 Liquidity rebate trading has been
scrutinized because it allows rebate traders to basically trade for free by
having their commission costs and exchange fees covered by the exchanges
and ECNs.
¶26

Another concept tied to liquidity trading is known as flash trading
or issuing flash orders. A flash order is a trade based on access to
information for a matter of milliseconds that is not yet public. Flash orders
developed due to the competition that exchanges face over the volume of
shares posted on their platforms. In order to further encourage trading on
their platform, some exchanges, such as the NASDAQ (up until September,
2009), allow firms to get a 30 millisecond peak at orders before they get
sent to other markets.74 The result is that
¶27

a trading firm can keep its order on a certain exchange for up to half a
second without matching an existing buy or sell order on another
69

See Iati, supra note 13 (quoting TABB group’s estimate).
See Arnuk & Saluzzi, supra note 58 (providing in-depth analysis of the
different types of trading strategies and the potential problems that these
strategies cause for the national markets).
71
See Hutchinson, supra note 63. (stating that rebate traders take advantage of
volume rebates of about 0.25 cents per share offered by exchanges to brokers
who post orders); see also Patterson & Rogow, supra note 11 (stating that these
rebates are about one-third a penny a share).
72
Hutchinson, supra note 63.
73
Arnuk & Saluzzi, supra note 57.
74
See Patterson & Rogow, supra note 11 (describing flash orders and the
reasons why some exchanges allowed them).
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exchange, a move that puts it in a position of poster, rather than
responder. The hope is that another trader who needs to buy or sell
quickly steps in on the other side of the trade . . . [a] dynamic that
boosts the chance the flash-order trader will complete the trade on the
75
exchange and get the rebate.

Traders who benefit from the use of flash orders are shown the buy
and sell orders ahead of everyone else in the marketplace in exchange for a
fee. With this very small advance notice of market conditions, high
frequency traders can use their super-computers to conduct rapid statistical
analysis of the changing market state and trade ahead of the public market.
¶28

The use of flash orders in automated trading was virtually unheard
of until last year when financial blogs started criticizing firms such as
Goldman Sachs for gaining unfair profits through the practice.76 Recently,
there has been a great deal of controversy over this practice and the SEC has
proposed an outright ban on the use of flash orders.77 The next section will
explore the controversy and legal issues surrounding these trading strategies
as well as the pros and cons of high frequency trading.
¶29

III. CONTROVERSY AND LEGALITY
A. Recent Controversy and Legal Issues
Because high frequency trading strategies utilize ultralow latency,
co-location and expensive technology to seemingly front-run the markets,
there has been a great deal of controversy recently over some of the trading
strategies employed by HFT firms. Additionally, “unlike registered brokerdealers, many HFT players aren’t regulated or committed to the capital
requirements for market-making in particular stocks.”78 The major debate
over high frequency trading came into the public spotlight with the
attempted theft of Goldman Sach’s HFT platform last summer and has
expanded to criticism over HFT firms like GETCO and the legality of the
HFT strategies themselves.79
¶30
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Id.
For an example of one such financial blog containing multiple entries
criticizing these practices, see ZeroHedge, http://www.zerohedge.com (last
visited Mar. 26, 2010).
77
The controversy and legality of this practice is discussed in greater detail in
Part III of this iBrief.
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Scott Powell, Wall Street’s New Race Toward Danger, BARRON’S, Mar. 8,
2010, http://online.barrons.com/article/SB126783128753256821.html.
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See, e.g., Mathew Goldstein, Commentary, A Goldman trading scandal?,
REUTERS (July 5, 2009, 11:11:00 EST),
http://blogs.reuters.com/commentaries/2009/07/05/a-goldman-trading-scandal/
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The use of flash orders and dark pools has been another area of
apprehension, and the SEC has already promulgated regulations to curb
their use. Lastly, concern has been raised over “naked access,” which may
leave the markets vulnerable to devastation at the hands of reckless HF
traders. Despite these reservations, there is still evidence to suggest that
HFT benefits the markets and curbing its use would be to the detriment of
all investors.
¶31

1. Attempted Theft at Goldman Sachs
¶32
In July 2009, Goldman Sach’s proprietary algorithmic trading code
was allegedly stolen by a Russian immigrant named Sergey Aleynikov.80
The platform that Aleynikov tried to steal was the proprietary trading
system that Goldman uses in its algorithmic trading of stocks and
commodities, a high-frequency trading platform that Aleynikov himself
supposedly helped create.81 Federal authorities claimed the platform
contained Goldman’s top secret mathematical formulas and algorithms that
the company utilizes to generate massive profits.
Because this theft also coincided with the current U.S. recession,
speculation became rampant over this “new” technology. Some in the
national media have speculated that such a theft could collapse the
economy.82 Some in the financial press have portrayed Aleykinov as a mass
criminal who sought to use this technology to unhinge the fabric of our
society; others speculated that such computer programs could derail an
entire bank with the push of a button.83
¶33

High frequency trading had finally gone public, and it wasn’t pretty.
In the months that followed, dozens of other news stories discussed the
practices of Goldman Sachs, specialized HFT firms, and high frequency
trading generally. Since then, various lawmakers, government agencies, and
financial executives have battled over the merits and drawbacks of HFT.
¶34

2. Current Areas of Controversy
¶35
More recently, the controversy related to high frequency trading has
centered on the legality of the strategies themselves; in other words,
whether certain practices related to HFT are inherently unfair to the average
investor. If so, could these strategies have even possibly lead to the financial
(detailing the attempted theft of the trading software and its possible
implications for Goldman Sachs).
80
See id.
81
Id.
82
See Jonathan Weil, Goldman Sachs Loses Grip on its Doomsday Machine,
BLOOMBERG, July 9, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=aFeyqdzYcizc.
83
See, e.g., id.
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crisis? More recent media focus has also centered on the use of “flash
orders” and the SEC’s proposition of banning them.84 Another related area
gaining criticism is the use of “dark pools” by those attempting to evade
high-frequency traders.85
Because of rampant accusations that flash orders favor insiders,
some lawmakers have urged the SEC to ban them. Senator Charles
Schumer, for instance, sent letters to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro late last
summer demanding changes. Schumer argued that flash orders allow market
insiders to utilize “rapid trading platforms to trade ahead of those orders and
profit from advanced knowledge of buying and selling activity.”86 Because
of this outcry, the NASDAQ OMX stopped offering flash order types on
September 1, 2009.87 Finally, on September 17, 2009, the SEC proposed
banning flash orders entirely. The SEC’s proposed rule amendment would
eliminate the flash order exception from Rule 602 of Reg. NMS under the
Securities Act of 1934.88 Under the proposed rule, the tactic of flashing
marketable prices to certain market participants would be banned entirely.
Instead, “exchanges and [Alternative Trading Systems] would be required
to handle marketable orders that they are unable to execute at the best
displayed prices in another manner, such as by routing marketable orders
away to execute against the best displayed quotations at another
exchange.”89 Playing off of the concerns of lawmakers, the SEC has
reasoned that flash orders “no longer serve the interests of long-term
¶36
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See, e.g., Edgar Ortega & Eric Martin, Schumer Asks SEC to Ban Flash
Orders Used by High Speed Traders, BLOOMBERG, July 24, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ajcRCWFi5MLs.
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A dark pool, also known as a “dark pool of liquidity” is a crossing network
that provides liquidity that is not displayed on order books. Dark pools are
useful for traders who wish to move large numbers of shares anonymously,
without revealing themselves to the open market. For further definition and
various articles related to dark pools, see Dark Pools, AUTOMATED TRADER,
http://www.automatedtrader.net/glossary/Dark+Pools (last visited Mar. 26,
2010).
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Ortega, supra note 84.
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Jacob Bunge & Kevin Kingsbury, UPDATE: Nasdaq to Stop Offering Flash
Order Types on Sep. 1, DOW JONES NEWSWIRE, Aug. 6, 2009,
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-newsstory.aspx?storyid=200908061413dowjonesdjonline000813&title=updatenasdaq-to-stop-offering-flash-order-types-on-sep-1.
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Proposed Amendments to Rule 610 of Regulation NMS, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,738,
20,762–63 (Apr. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242), available at
http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=YbRXEb/8/2/0&WAISaction=retrieve.
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investors and could detract from the efficiency of the national market
system”.90 The SEC believes the wide use of automated high frequency
trading on today’s exchanges has detracted from the original purpose of
flash orders and could create a “two-tiered market.”91
While the SEC’s proposed rule has not yet gone into effect,92 there
is still much fighting to be done, as options leaders and industry executives
speak out against the proposed ban. For instance, options leaders believe
that the ban should only apply to the equity industry and have stated that
flash orders benefit retail investors by keeping costs lower.93 These
concerns appear warranted, and the SEC should probably take them into
account before applying a wide-reaching ban on the practice. Much of the
difficulty in regulating such practices occurs because of the wide use of
automated trading on both sides (buy and sell sides) of the spectrum and the
political issues that have dominated the debate over how to better regulate
the financial markets. The SEC is mainly concerned with the possible
creation of a two-tiered market system, which favors those with
sophisticated computer systems over retail investors. Both the traditional
investors and the high frequency traders utilize many of the same exchanges
and trading platforms to get deals done. This approach could lead to
problems in the future as the exchanges continue to re-calibrate fee
structures and technology to attract high frequency traders.94 Because of the
possibility of such measures being implemented, the SEC has begun taking
steps to try to solve potential problems related to this bifurcated market
structure and what it means for the broader investing public.95
¶37

Mirroring the flash order controversy is recent speculation over the
use of so-called “dark pools of liquidity” (dark pools). Dark pools are
¶38
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Id. at 16.
See id. at 31–33 (advancing the SEC’s concerns that flash orders may create a
two-tiered market in which the public does not have access, through the
consolidated quotation data streams, to information about the best available
prices for listed securities, because the public would not receive flashed
information in the consolidated quotation data).
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As of May 27, 2010, the rule had not yet been adopted. Some exchanges, such
as Direct Edge, still offer flash orders.
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See Christine Birkner, Flash Orders Under Attack, FUTURES, Jan. 1, 2010,
http://www.futuresmag.com/Issues/2010/January-2010/Pages/Flash-ordersunder-attack.aspx (quoting industry leaders who claim that the flash order ban
“may restrict or eliminate price improvement auctions in the options market”
and limit trading venue choice for retail investors).
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Jeremy Grant, Quick View: A High-frequency End-game, FT.COM (Oct. 13,
2009, 11:14AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4dbd933c-b7d8-11de-8ca900144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1 (on file with author).
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anonymous trading pools that traders turn to instead of public exchanges
such as the NYSE to avoid revealing their identities and giving competitors
clues about their trading strategies.96 There are roughly 40 dark pools
operating today, some privately operated, but most operated by brokerdealers. “Dark pools find matches for blocks of shares without publishing
the orders or the identities of the institutions.”97 Many of these dark pools
developed as a means of evading high frequency traders by tipping off the
markets. For instance, dark pools such as Liquidnet developed specifically
with the goal of allowing large anonymous trades without tipping off high
frequency arbitragers that a big order is in the market and moving prices.98
Today, crossing systems like Liquidnet, Goldman Sach’s Sigma X and
Credit Suisse’s Advanced Execution Services handle more than 10% of
stock trades.99 Their widespread use and lack of transparency has now
turned lawmakers’ attention on their possible regulation.
Because of concerns that these private venues limit transparency in
the securities markets and may put smaller investors at a disadvantage,
lawmakers have called out for limits to be placed on the number of
transactions on dark pools.100 The anonymity of dark pools may give cover
to sharp operators known as “gamers” who could harm investors through
predatory trading at ultra low latency.101 It has also been suggested that dark
pools can siphon liquidity from exchange markets and arbitrarily decide
¶39
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interest (“IOIs”) to other participants. The amount of information conveyed in
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at http://www.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/091116DarkPools.pdf.
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who can trade on the pool and who cannot,102 which could lead to frontrunning and undetected insider trading. This type of activity undermines
market efficiency since stock prices may not adequately reflect market
movement and trading activity. For these reasons, the SEC has also
proposed changes to its existing ATS regulations, which include subjecting
certain Indicator’s of Interest (IOI’s) to disclosure requirements, lowering
the ATS trading volume threshold for displaying best priced orders on the
tape, and amending the existing rules to require post-trade transparency
comparable to that required of registered exchanges.103
While such regulations would decrease market ambiguity, they also
could cause problems for some investors, especially those in small and midcap markets who trade primarily on these alternative trading systems and
those looking to evade high frequency traders. For instance, real time
reporting of the venue where print occurred may only benefit ultralow
latency investors, instead of the “average Joe” investor. Because of high
frequency trading’s prominence, the next few years of changing regulations
will be extremely interesting. The SEC has a very difficult job ahead of it in
attempting to regulate these innovative practices while at the same time
upholding the agency’s primary concerns: protecting the average investor
and ensuring markets remain relatively efficient.
¶40

The last major area of concern is with the practice of “naked
access” between high frequency outfits and broker-dealers. Naked, or
sponsored access, allows traders to send orders directly to exchanges using
a brokerage’s computer identification code.104 Critics say naked access
heightens the risk of reckless trades (by HF traders) that could destabilize
the broader market. Exchanges often don’t know the identity of firms using
sponsored access, because the only way to identify the firms is through the
computer code.105 Additionally, the lack of regulation on naked access
allows a reckless high frequency trader to conceivably pump out hundreds
of thousands of faulty orders in the two minute period it typically takes to
rectify a trading system glitch.106 Sang Lee, a market analyst from Aite
¶41
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Group, believes that “[i]n the worst case scenario, electronic fat fingering or
intentional trading fraud could take down not only the sponsored
participants, but also the sponsoring broker and its counterparties, leading to
an uncontrollable domino effect that would threaten overall systematic
market stability.”107 Because of these doomsday scenarios and others
advanced by some Democratic lawmakers, the SEC will most likely
propose rules to limit this practice in the upcoming months.

B. Is High Frequency Trading Harmful or Beneficial to the National
Market System?
The recent controversy over high frequency trading raises the
question of whether HFT is actually harmful or beneficial to the national
market system. The potential benefits of high frequency are that it adds
liquidity to the markets, speeds execution time, and narrows the price
spreads between markets and exchanges. HFT firms may even be better
liquidity providers than the specialists of the past because they do not have
a conflict of interest. Additionally, computerized trading rewards firms for
investing in technology, so the “technological arms race” may just be a
matter of survival of the fittest. However, the low to zero capital
requirements that these so-claimed “liquidity providers” carry is
problematic and speculation over the danger that unchecked HF trading
could cause to the entire system is truly frightening. In actuality, the true
effects of HFT are difficult to measure, and much more research must be
done by institutions and lawmakers before these questions can accurately be
answered. This section analyzes the problems and benefits associated with
HFT.
¶42

1. Problems with High Frequency Trading
¶43
Criticism over high frequency trading will most likely continue as
the U.S. attempts to implement regulatory overhaul of the financial services
industry. Despite this, high frequency trading is likely to grow in use, even
with the new rules. Lawmakers must realize the complexities of the practice
and the weigh the possible costs and benefits against each other if effective
rules are to be put in place and the markets are to function efficiently.
On the one hand, high frequency trading is worrisome because of
the lack of information available on its potential uses, the possibility that it
could be used to manipulate the markets or obtain an unfair advantage, and
its potential to lead to another financial crisis. Although the practice has
been around for a number of years, many of the strategies that institutions
¶44
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and HFT firms employ are extremely secretive, and not much is known
about the specifics of how they work. There is neither government nor
industry oversight over the types of trading algorithms being developed, and
many of these programs are so cutting edge that only a few mathematicians
and engineers understand how to operate them. The potential problems
related to theft by rival traders or insiders such as Aleynikov are vast. While
there are messaging standards put in place for electronic trading, such as the
FIX Protocol,108 the fact remains that this form of trading is largely
unchecked. The ambiguities related to flash trading and trading on ATS’s
such as dark pools also increases skepticism of illegal activity. While flash
orders are likely on their way out, dark pools are still only recently
becoming illuminated.
The lack of understanding of HFT leads many to believe companies
like Goldman or GETCO may be engaging in illegal activities and that HF
traders game the markets to obtain an unfair advantage. Other criticism is
levied at the low barriers to entry to becoming a HF trader and the degree to
which exchanges court HFT firms with the use of rebates. Since these
rebates drive up the price of the brokers who take liquidity from the market,
the costs of these rebates could conceivably be passed on to investors. In
describing liquidity rebate trading, one commentator even described the
exchanges as “drug dealers trying to control their turf and the HFT’s are the
drug addicts.”109 While these concerns may appear far-fetched, they do raise
important questions about the inherent fairness of automated trading when
levied against non-institutional investors. Stock volatility due to predatory
algorithmic trading is also concerning. “[Predatory algorithmic] strategies
are designed to cause institutional [algorithmic] orders to buy or sell shares
at prices higher or lower than where the stock had been trading, creating a
situation where the predatory algorithm can lock in a profit from the
artificial increase or decrease in price.”110 Such algorithmic trading and
short-selling could cause a stock to move 10 – 15 cents without any tangible
rationale.111
¶45

Playing off of the notion that program trading helped cause the
crash of ’87, some Wharton professors also believe that fully automated
¶46
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trading by HFT firms could cause a similar collapse in the future.112
Similarly, concern over “naked access” is recognized by both lawmakers
and industry insiders alike.113 The possibility of reckless trading by HF
algo-traders is something that must be taken into serious consideration if
future financial disasters are to be averted. It has been proposed that
automated trading on strategies that key off the same factors, such as price
dips in specific stocks, could cause programs to jump on the bandwagon at
the same time and create a crisis.114 The possibility that another financial
catastrophe could occur in a matter of seconds due to a reckless trader is
reason enough for investigation and future regulation.
2. Benefits of High Frequency Trading
¶47
On the other hand, variations of automated trading have been
around for nearly twenty years now, and the arguments that the markets and
exchanges have evolved to compensate for this and are better off do seem to
have merit. There is evidence to suggest that high frequency trading has
dramatically lowered spreads in the most available stocks and closed gaps
across markets.115 Reductions in the bid-ask spreads also reduce trading
costs for fund investors. According to Gus Sauter, chief investment officer
of the Vanguard Group mutual fund company, “generally, wide spreads are
seen as kind of inefficiency, with buyers and sellers having difficulty
agreeing on a price that accurately reflects what is known about a stock.
Narrow spreads mean the market is working better.”116 By increasing the
speed at which trades can be made on both the buy and sell sides, such
actions could actually increase market efficiency. Sauter also believes that
HFT reduces “market-impact” cost by making it easier to break up big
trades into little ones while still conducting them quickly.117 Because of
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these benefits, critics of high frequency trading may be missing the bigger
picture: HFT adds liquidity, speeds execution and narrows spreads.118
Healthy competition is also essential to the free market, and HFT
strategies developed to adapt to our more tech-heavy society. By recruiting
the best and the brightest programmers and “quants” from the nation’s top
colleges, various firms can ensure that they remain competitive in this new
national market. Such competition among high-frequency traders may serve
to tighten bid-offer spreads, “reducing transaction costs for all market
participants, both institutional and retail.”119 While institutional investors or
specialized HF firms could benefit directly from HFT by hiring their own
algo-traders or outsourcing their investing activities to other HF firms,
individual investors may also benefit indirectly. “Individual investors are
the ultimate beneficiaries when their pension funds and mutual funds can
transact large volumes of trades anonymously with great speed and at lower
cost.”120Although smaller active traders may be at a disadvantage when
directly trading securities, nearly all who have money in funds will benefit
indirectly. Protecting the mutual fund investor at the expense of individual
traders is arguably more important if the greatest good is to be achieved for
the greatest majority. While HFT has caused the trading game to change,
the fact also remains that high frequency trading is not illegal (at least not
yet).
¶48

CONCLUSION
Because of its relative novelty and the uncertainty related to many
of the trading strategies being used today, the debate over high frequency
trading will likely continue long into the future. As both old and new
emerging markets continue to become highly digitized, algorithmic trading
strategies will constantly advance by those with the resources and
intelligence to stay ahead of the competition. High frequency trading
appears to be an irreversible trading trend in the U.S. and at its current pace
will only expand its share of the U.S. stock market in the next few years. It
appears “there is no way to put the technology genie (and hence market
innovations) back in the bottle,”121 and government agencies will find
themselves with the increasingly difficult task of how to monitor and, if
necessary, regulate the trading innovations that develop.
¶49
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It is still uncertain whether HFT is more beneficial or harmful to the
national market structure. While the individual investor sitting at home
trading stocks online will be at an increasing disadvantage, high frequency
trading may benefit the majority of investors in the long-run. As some have
argued, the “fact is technology will always add opportunities for smart
people to find new ways to profit. The problem isn’t the intent to profit, the
problem is the impact on others who aren’t so smart or simply don’t have
access to the technology.”122 However, the lack of regulation of these
practices and potential problems to our nation’s capital structure cannot be
overlooked. If many trades involve simultaneous buy and sell orders by the
same trader, high frequency trading may not actually be making as large a
contribution to liquidity as the big trading numbers suggest.
¶50

In regulating HFT and its related practices, the SEC must walk a
fine line in protecting small investors while also maintaining fair and
efficient markets for all. Current efforts to regulate flash orders do seem to
be a step in the right direction. However, any new rules advanced must take
into account the competitive market’s ability to adapt and both the long and
short term effects on different types of investors. Possible solutions may lie
in introducing rules that eliminate the effects of pinging, or introducing
certain taxes on share transactions or rules that curb the more harmful types
of algo-trading across the board.123 Regardless, it is vital that government
agencies and institutions alike study these matters more thoroughly before
issuing any new regulations.
¶51

Although the future of HFT remains uncertain, it is clear that
innovative technology will continue to rule the financial world. If we are to
remain a free market, lawmakers must grapple with the very difficult
question of how to most effectively regulate the changing national markets
while at the same time allowing them to evolve naturally. This problem will
no doubt be a recurring one as the evolution of technology continues to
shape our financial markets.
¶52

122

See Hutchinson, supra note 62 (containing a comment by one reader, Andrew
Jefferson, dated Aug. 14, 2009, following Hutchinson’s article).
123
See, e.g., ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 58, at 5 (advancing many different
regulatory measures that could possibly be put in place to stop the harmful
effects of “toxic” high frequency trading).

